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The primary intent of this paper is to examine the 
feasibility of the Reagan Administration's Enterprise Zone Pro¬ 
posal. Strict attention is paid to the types of problems encoun¬ 
tered by urban areas, such as, the rising crime rate, unemploy¬ 
ment, declinig tax base and the uneducated, which stress the 
need for Enterprise Zones. An attempt has also been made to high¬ 
light past urban economic development programs that have failed 
in their attempt to revitalize urban areas. 
The concept of Enterprise Zones is a new urban renewal 
proposal. Due to its newness the main source of data was ob¬ 
tained from secondary information such as periodicals, books, 
pamphlets, and unpublished materials. 
This study is significant because it addresses the reali¬ 
ties of urban areas when examining the feasibility of Enterprise 
Zones. In addition, it has come at a time when important deci¬ 
sions will be made concerning the future of Enterprise Zone 
legislation. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the dawn of civilization the city has played the 
central role in the evolution of human society. The great 
cities of the past have been the dominant influence of European 
conventional thought in urban areas. However, today's small 
cities in the United States can provide the same social services 
as major European cities, for many small cities have been sig¬ 
nificant to the development of America. But the structure and 
foundation of the city has vastly deteriorated. It is apparent 
that the major causes are related to the problems of population 
decline and the lack of economic support. This creates a simul¬ 
taneous erosion of the tax base and an increase in the demand for 
city expenditures of welfare and public services. Consequently, 
there exists the intractable problem of urban blight. The domi¬ 
nant influences in the various districts of major cities have 
been plagued by the probably irreversible spiral of decay and 
decline. Therefore, the Reagan Administration has made efforts 
to diminish such inner city blight by proposing a "supply-side 
urban policy to revitalize the inner city."^ This proposal will 
call upon the private sector to stimulate an increase in jobs 
and investments, for this is considered to be more efficient than 
relying on direct aid from the government, as in the past. 
■'"Robert G. Collazo, "Enterprise Zones Trickle Down in 
the Big Cities", Black Enterprise, July 1982, p. 50. 
1 
2 
The major thrusts of the Administration's plan are tax 
incentives and regulatory relief to firms that are willing to 
take the risk of conducting business in the inner cities. The 
Administration's aim is to convert specially designated areas 
of urban decay into Enterprise Zones and, according to proponents, 
"their success will eventually create a resurgence of slumping 
regions and a revitalization of depressed urban economies at 
2 
considerable less cost to the American taxpayer." 
The purpose of this study, therefore, is to examine the 
feasibility of the Reagan Administration's Enterprise Zone pro¬ 
posal and to examine its relevance to the crisis of the inner 
city. 
Origination of Research Problem 
The writer served as an intern at the Martin Luther King, 
Jr. Center for Nonviolent Social Change, Inc. The research prob¬ 
lem, however, is unrelated to the specifics of her internship due 
to the lack of cooperation from the Center to provide the neces¬ 
sary information needed for research. After consultation with 
her advisor, it was suggested that she identify a public sector 
related problem with an urban setting. The Reagan Administra¬ 
tion's Enterprise Zone Proposal was identified because of its 
urban focus and its policy implications. The proposal addresses 
an urban problem that the writer became aware of during her in¬ 
ternship at the Center, as a Research Assistant. 
2 
Ibid., p. 51. 
II. THE PROBLEM 
During the summer of 1982 the writer served as an intern 
with The Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Nonviolent Social 
Change, Inc. for a sixteen-week period in the capacity of Research 
Assistant in the King Library and Archives. Her primary respon¬ 
sibilities included conducting research on the life of the late 
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and issues and strategies used in the 
civil rights campaigns. 
Through information obtained from reviewing printed ma¬ 
terials and films in the King Library and Archives, the intern 
became aware of the various problems faced in urban areas, espe¬ 
cially the need for rejuvenation in the inner cities. 
The Reagan Administration has proposed the adoption of 
Enterprise Zones to revitalize the inner city. Overall, the 
basic objectives of these programs are to create jobs in the na¬ 
tion's depressed areas and to redevelop and revitalize the geo- 
3 
graphic zone areas. The Enterprise Zone plan is comprised of 
four major elements: (1) tax relief at the Federal, state and 
local levels, (2) regulatory relief at the Federal, state and 
local levels, (3) efforts to improve public services, possibly in¬ 
cluding experimentation with private alternatives for those ser¬ 
vices, and (4) involvement in the program by private, local and 
^"The Administration's Enterprise Zone Proposal", March 





Statement of the Problem 
The Reagan Administration has proposed the establishment 
of Enterprise Zones to rejuvenate the inner city. Conceptually, 
the proposal appears attractive and offers a new approach to 
deal with the crisis of the inner cities. If it were to be 
activated as conceived, the program could possibly bring the 
desired results of alleviating urban blight. However, there is 
another dimension of this concept, i.e., the realities of the 
American private sector and the fiscal problems of municipali¬ 
ties and rural towns. Examples of this dimension include the 
existence of a "high crime" rate that cities have, a declining 
tax base, declining population, a rising pool of unskilled youth, 
and relatively high business costs. Keeping these urban prob¬ 
lems in mind one can appropriately ask: Will companies seri¬ 
ously consider economically depressed municipalities as healthy 
business environments in which to operate? Will cities, strapped 
for revenues, be able to offer the kinds of tax incentives that 
will act as carrots to potential business enterprises? These 
questions will be addressed throughout the study. 
Another important factor to be considered is the reduc¬ 
tion of capital gains and business income taxes that may not 
necessarily aid small businesses struggling to gain profits dur¬ 
ing the first several years of operation. Small businesses 
usually need assistance with initial operating costs and low in¬ 
terest venture capital. The major concern is that existing 
^Ibid., p. 3. 
5 
small and minority businesses in Enterprise Zone areas may 
suffer from increased competition, rather than benefit from 
tax breaks and other business incentives. 
The problems raised above suggest that the success of 
the proposal may be open to question. The task of the degree 
paper therefore is to explore the merits and demerits of the 
proposal and offer a conclusion and recommendations based on 
the very limited data obtained for this study. 
III. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Cities are the heart and pulse of America, the centers 
of business and culture and the home of three-quarters of the 
5 
United States population—about 173 million people. Look at 
San Francisco from across the bay: steep hills and blue water 
and the sun gleaming off the Golden Gate Bridge. Or view the 
incomparable New York skyline from the air at night and you will 
envision millions of lights as far as the eye can see. Or fly 
over Atlanta's "Golden Triangle" with its gleaming office towers, 
a model of downtown renewal.^ 
But the portrayal of the city, in itself, can be very 
deceiving. Amidst their dauntless skylines, America's cities 
are seething with trouble. This deterioration of these urban 
areas has been coined the "urban crisis". Among its multiple 
problems are: urban blight, racial tension, poor education, 
decaying housing and a surplus of uneducated, unemployed and un¬ 
skilled inhabitants. Older people, the very ones who are least 
7 
able to escape, are particularly susceptible to these problems. 
Since 1965, Federal funds for state and local development 
5 
Scott Thods, "Crowds and More Crowds-No End of Urban 
Hassles", U.S. News and World Report, April 5, 1982, p. 47. 
6"Our Cities-Are they Really Doomed?" Senior Scholastic, 
February 16, 1970, p. 3. 




programs have amounted to $59 billion. In New York City's South 
Bronx, for example (population 416,000), one-third of the popula¬ 
tion is on welfare. Thousands of businesses have fled in the 
past five years—forcing more than 15,000 residents out of work. 
Comprising the city as a whole, almost 165,000 private sector jobs 
have vanished in the past ten years, costing the city hundreds of 
millions in lost tax revenues. Philadelphia, Chicago, St. Louis, 
Newark, Atlanta and several other cities are experiencing similar 
problems.® 
President Richard Nixon, during his Presidency, felt he 
had the answer to the crisis of the city by proposing the Compre¬ 
hensive Employment and Training Act (CETA), President Jimmy Carter 
proposed The Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG); and the incum¬ 
bent President Ronald Reagan put forth a supply-side urban renewal 
scheme to rejuvenate and revitalize the core of the city by pro¬ 
posing the Enterprise Zone approach. 
The birthplace of the idea of Enterprize Zones has not 
been fully established. In June of 1978, Sir Geoffrey Howe,. M.P., 
while serving as an economist and spokesman for the British Con¬ 
servative Party, delivered the first formal lecture on the idea 
of Enterprise Zones. During the lecture Howe admitted that the 
"germ of the concept came chiefly from Peter Hall, an urban plan¬ 
ning expert at Reading University and a former chairman of the 
9 
Fabian Society. Subsequently, Hall was influenced by particular 
^Mark Frazier and Dick Cowder, "Strong Medicine for Sick 
Cities II. Cutting the Ties that Bind", Reader's Digest, June 19 8 3, 
p. 158. 
9 
Stuart M. Butler, Enterprise Zones Greenlining the 
Inner Cities (New York: Universe Books, 1981), p. 95. 
8 
conclusions that were previously established concerning the 
approach to urban economic development. Eventually, this 
prompted the concept of the Enterprise Zone. 
The major purpose of Enterprise Zones is to promote 
self-help in the city instead of relying on government agencies 
and larger commercial lending institutions. For instance, the 
concept claims that it is wasteful for government to allocate 
substantial sums of money to housing projects for commercial 
purposes. In essence, the Enterprise Zone plan suggests that 
the local entrepreneur and the urban inhabitants should collabo¬ 
rate their efforts in order to make the most of the minimum re¬ 
sources available. Under such a cooperative design, the govern¬ 
ment could implement the proposal more effectively. In addition, 
the residents could "achieve stability if they created a climate 
where self-helf projects would be more likely to succeed."^ 
This line of thinking has been adopted in proposals set 
forth in Britain during the last three years, and was 
recently introduced in the United States. Peter Hall was the 
first to utilize this new approach of thinking in England by 
developing the "Freeport Program". He believed that Freeport was 
the answer to the blight of the inner city. The central elements 
of Hall's program would involve the encouragement of entrepreneur- 
11 
ship and capital in the heart of declining cities. 
10Stuart M. Butler, Enterprise Zones Pioneering in the 
Inner City (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1980), p. 
21. 
11 Ibid., p. 22. 
9 
Peter Hall did concede that the Freeport Plan was a grave 
departure from the familiar mold of the British welfare state, 
but this new strategy enrichës the economy through the provi¬ 
sion of job opportunities for low-skilled and unskilled people. 
Thus, the benefits of the plan outweighed any negative challenges. 
However, Hall did caution that the Freeport Plan was only fitting 
for specific localities, and: 
since it would represent an extremely drastic last- 
ditch solution to urban problems, it would be tried 
only on a very small scale. It is most appropriate 
to inner city areas that are largely abandoned by 
people or alternative areas with very grave social 
and economic problems.12 
Hall's idea encouraged several British politicians to look 
carefully for a policy based on similar foundations. Ultimately, 
13 
this search led to the concept known as the Enterprise Zone. 
Although both plans were similar, Howe's plan was a more modest 
approach than Hall's. For example, Howe's idea was to set up 
test market areas or laboratories which would enable fresh poli¬ 
cies to "prime the pump" of prosperity, and could establish 
14 
their potential for doing so elsewhere. Moreover, Howe envi¬ 
sioned the Enterprise Zones as being testing grounds for differ¬ 
ing social arrangements where individuals could determine the 
effectiveness of their idea. 
The Enterprise Zone concept was first introduced to the 
12 
Stuart M. Butler, Enterprise Zones Greenlininq the Inner 
Cities (New York: Universe Books, 1981), p. 97. 
13 
Speech to the Bow Group, London, June 26, 1978. 
14 
Stuart M. Butler, Enterprise Zone Pioneering in the 
Inner City, p. 23. 
10 
15 
United States in 1979 by the Heritage Foundation. In light 
of the different political and economic emphasis and diversities 
in this country, several modifications have been added to the 
original idea in the Heritage Foundation's publications and spon¬ 
sored articles.^ 
The introduction of the Enterprise Zone concept was 
furthered by Congressman Jack Kemp, a conservative Republican 
from Buffalo, and Robert Garcia, a liberal Democrat representing 
New York City's impoverished South Bronx. They introduced the 
17 Enterprise Zone bill in Congress in June 1980. After a year 
of debates, a revised bill was introduced on June 3, 1981, with 
18 hearings on the revised bill held in the late summer. The bill 
was subsequently passed and is formally known as the Urban Jobs 
19 20 and Enterprise Zone Act (H.R. 3824), or the Kemp-Garcia Proposal. 
Under this proposal, any urban area that consists of at 
least 4,000 people would qualify as an Enterprise Zone if it 
has an unemployment rate well in excess of the national average, 
or if a substantial number of its families were living below the 
21 poverty level. Companies that move into the designated areas 
■^Speech to the Bow Group. 
■^Stuart Butler, "Enterprise Zones: A Real Solution to 
Urban Decay", The Lincoln Review (Winter 1980). 
l^Mary Parker, "Enterprise Zones: A New Concept in Urban 
Reinvestment", Federal Home Loan Bank, August 1981, p. 3. 
T p xoThomas Martin, "Enterprise Zones Legislation Eagerly 
Awaited", National Real Estate Investor (February 1982), p. 26. 
l^Mary Parker, "Enterprise Zones", p. 3. 
2®J. Poole, "Enterprise Zones May not be Enterprising 
Enough", Black Enterprise, February 1982, p. 27. 
21 
Robert McEtroy, "Urban Enterprise Zones", Newsweek, 
February 23, 1981, p. 65. 
11 
would be treated to a number of Federal tax breaks, including 
a reduction in both capital-gains and regular corporate income 
22 taxes and accelerated depreciation of their assets. In addi¬ 
tion, the Kemp-Garcia Urban Jobs and Enterprise Zone Act also 
provides for a tax credit for qualified employees working in a 
zone; a 100 percent reduction in capital-gains tax rates for 
unincorporated businesses in a zone; and a large reduction in 
corporate capital-gains tax rates on transactions outside the 
23 zone. 
Essentially, the Kemp-Garcia Bill would establish ten to 
twenty-five Enterprise Zones per year for three years. These 
zones would have to meet standards concerning physical and 
economic characteristics and the local government would be re- 
24 
quired to make certain commitments. 
As expected, President Reagan heartily endorsed the urban 
Enterprise Zone concept in his January 26, 1982 State of the 
Union Address. He suggested that offering incentives for busi¬ 
nesses to operate in designated blighted areas could revitalize 
25 
the ghettoes and spur employment. Consequently, on March 23, 
1982, President Reagan sent to Congress the Enterprise Zone Act. 
The objective of the act and the proposed program, accord¬ 
ing to the Reagan Administration, 
22Ibid., p. 65. 
23 Margaret Price, "Enterprise Zones Win White House 
Favor", Industry Week, February 8, 1982, p. 28. 
24 
"Controversy Over Urban Enterprise Zones", The Congres¬ 
sional Digest, March 1982, p. 69. 
25price, "Enterprise Zones Win White House Favor," p. 28. 
12 
is to create an environment conducive to economic 
revitalization and job creation in distressed areas 
through relief from taxes, regulation, and other 
governmental burdens, improving municipal services 
and infrastructure, and involving private entities 
and neighborhood organizations. Because the program 
is based on the concept of removing government bur¬ 
dens rather than providing government subsidies, it 
requires no Federal appropriations. 
For a more detailed overview of the Enterprise Zones incentives 
see Table 1. 
Nominations for Enterprise Zones will be made by state 
and local governments based on Federal criteria such as unemploy¬ 
ment rates, poverty levels and population loss. Founded on this 
criteria, there will be more than two thousand cities, rural 
areas, and Indian reservations with zone eligible areas. The 
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development will then designate 
27 
up to twenty-five zones in each of the three years. The size 
of the zones and the number of the businesses in each will vary 
extensively. 
Inherently speaking, the Enterprise Zone concept is 
sound in theory. By dismissing some of the tax burdens and 
regulations, thereby inducing incentives, private businesses may 
return to the sluggish cities to invest. The benefits accruing 
from these incentives: 
are intended to reduce the costs of production within 
the area to such an extent that managers making loca¬ 
tional decisions for economic activities, and indivi¬ 
duals establishing businesses will find the zones to 
0 
"The Enterprise Zone Employment and Development Act 
of 1982". Handout. 
27 
Barry H. Lecerf, "Rebuilding Economic America", Iron 
Age, September 6, 1982, p. 28. 
TABLE 1 
FEDERAL ENTERPRISE ZONE PROPOSAL SUMMARY OF INCENTIVES 
Capital-related Incentives Labor-related Incentives 
Capital gains tax exemption on invest¬ 
ment within zones 
Additional investment tax credits of 
5% for personal property and 10% for 
new construction. 
Extension of unused credit carry-back 
to three years and the unused credit 
carry over for the life of the zone or 
15 years, whichever is longer. 
Availability of small issue industrial 
developments bonds within zones beyond 
1986 and accelerated cost recovery for 
property financed by these bonds. 
Employer tax credits for hiring 
disadvantaged workers equal to 
50% of the worker's wage for three 
years, phasing out by 10%, in years 
four to seven. This credit has no 
ceiling. 
Employer credits of 10% on total 
enterprise zone payroll (for exist¬ 
ing businesses; this is 10% of the 
increase in payroll after zone 
designation) for the first $17,500 
paid to qualified employees. 
Employee personal income tax credits 
of 5% on the first $10,500 in wages 
earned in the zone. 
Source: Stephen J. Bollinger, "Federal Enterprise Zone: The 




be optimal locations for their enterprises. 
One of the constraints imposed on these businesses is 
that some percentage of their employees are to be residents 
of the zone. If this is true, then jobs will indeed be created 
to employ the uneducated and unskilled inhabitants of the zone, 
which, as a consequence, will stimulate economic activity in 
the zone, thereby converting zone residents into productive 
citizens of the system. 
Several urban economic development programs have been 
tried over the years. The Model Cities program, the Comprehen¬ 
sive Employment and Training Act—CETA, and Operation Boot¬ 
strap (limited to Puerto Rico), are only a few of such pro¬ 
grams. The writer will discuss these three urban economic 
development programs in order to enlighten the reader on past 
endeavors to rebuild the inner city. 
The Model Cities program was also sound in theory. 
The program was designed to encourage participating cities to 
develop a concerted attack on social and economic problems as 
well as physical decay. Consequently, it required the coordi¬ 
nated efforts of all relevant agencies, and it emphasized the 
need for meaningful citizen participation. The Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD)' was named the administer- 
29 
ing agency. 
2 8 Barclay G. Jones and Donald M. Manson, "The Georgraphy 
of Enterprise Zones: A Critical Analysis", Economic Geography 
(October 1982), p. 329. “ 
29 
Marshall Kaplan, Gans, and Kahn, The Model Cities Pro¬ 
gram (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), p. 7. 
15 
In essence, eligible cities were to receive one-year 
planning grants with which to prepare comprehensive plans to 
improve the quality of life in their Model Neighborhoods. Both 
implementation and extensive planning would occur over a five- 
year demonstration period. During that time funding would be 
available through appropriate Federal categorical aid programs 
and supplemental Model Cities grants. The latter were to be 
used for new and innovative activities, the redirection of 
existing resources for more effective use, and the mobilization 
of additional resources.^ 
To qualify for designation as a Model City, communities 
were asked by HUD to meet several related requirements and per¬ 
formance criteria. These included: 
1. Establishment of a comprehensive planning organization to 
administer the program. 
2. Implementation of a complex set of sequential planning 
processes. 
3. Submission of carefully drafted and detailed plans and 
analyses.31 
Undoubtedly, in the late 1960s the Model Cities Program 
was abolished because it failed to achieve its goal and proved 
to be a waste of the taxpayers money. 
In keeping with the thrust to find a solution to urban 
problems, another alternative was adopted, namely, the Compre¬ 
hensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) of 1973. It was 
3°Ibid., p. 7. 
31 Office of Community Development, The Model Cities 
Program (Washington, D.C.: Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, 1973), p. 
16 
intended to increase the earned income of the entire spectrum 
of economically disadvantaged, unemployed and underemployed 
persons living in depressed areas by providing them with class¬ 
room instruction in occupational skills and other job-related 
32 training. Plagued by fraud and abuse, CETA was phased out 
in 1982 and according to Representative David R. Obey, D-Wis., 
"CETA had become a second most unpopular program in the coun- 
33 try after welfare". 
Finally, among the last of these languished ghetto 
revivers Is Operation Bootstrap. This plan induced thousands 
of United States plants to move to Puerto Rico because of in¬ 
centives similar to those recommended by the administration's 
Enterprise Zone proposal. Textile plants, toy manufacturers 
and other low-wage industries found Puerto Rico an attractive 
alternative to relatively high-wage, unionized areas of the 
industrial Northeast of the United States. However, only a few 
companies that employed highly skilled labor move to Puerto 
Rico. Consequently, Puerto Rico became a haven for low-wage, 
low-technology and economically marginal business; it never 
succeeded in reducing joblessness to mainland levels. The un¬ 
employment rate on the island remains high, and without the 
large emigration to New York and other United States cities, 
it would be even higher. Most Puerto Rican workers are still 
32 Department of Labor, Comprehensive Employment and 
Training Act, Office of the Federal Register, 1982/1983. 
33 
Congressional Quarterly Almanac, "CETA Jobs Act 
Extended", 95th Congress, 2nd Session, 1978. 
17 
employed in low-wage tourism or other services industries. 
Operation Bootstrap was not a national program. How¬ 
ever, it does have incentives similar to those of the Enterprise 
Zone proposal. Consequently, if the Reagan Administration has 
similar incentives in mind for the United States, then it may 
be useful for the President and his advisers to examine the 
results to date of the Puerto Rican experience. 
The above programs, Model Cities, CETA and Operation 
Bootstrap failed in their attempt to alleviate economic hard¬ 
ships of many United States cities. Enterprise Zones, on the 
other hand, have been referred to as the "fresh approach" to 
combating the urban crisis. ^ In the following pages the 
writer will attempt to analyze the feasibility of Enterprise 
Zones, both conceptually and realistically. 
34 
Stanley Aronowitz and Cary Goodman, "A Walk on the 
Supply Side", The Nation, February 21, 1981, p. 207. 
35 
Mark Michaelsen, "Enterprise Zones: A Fresh Approach", 
Current, October 1982, p. 50. 
IV. METHODOLOGY 
This study's focus is primarily an exploratory analysis 
of the Reagan Administration's Enterprise Zone Proposal. In 
the process of conducting the study the researcher has utilized 
an exploratory method of research. 
♦ 
The researcher's purpose for using such a method of 
research was to increase the researcher's familiarity with 
Enterprise Zones, and to inform the reader on the difficulties 
of establishing Enterprise Zones. In view of the fact that the 
Enterprise Zone concept is new and very little has been written 
on it, the exploratory method is considered to be the most 
feasible research tool to be adopted for this study,since this 
approach can assist in breaking new ground and can almost al¬ 
ways yield new insights on a research topic. 
A descriptive method of research, which is used to 
3 6 
describe situations and events, was not utilized because Enter¬ 
prise Zones are still an idea rather than an actual reality in 
American society. To offer a detailed description of Enterprise 
Zones, therefore, would be a very difficult exercise to accom¬ 
plish. 
Secondary data, including information gathered from 
scholarly works, government documents, books, newspaper articles, 
^6Earl R. Babbie, The Practice of Social Research (Bel¬ 
mont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1979), p. 86. 
18 
19 
periodicals, pamphlets and reports are used to obtain data 
for the study. 
V. ANALYSIS 
In analyzing the feasibility of Enterprise Zones the 
writer addresses some of the realities of urban areas in which 
Enterprise Zones will be located, while looking at the theore¬ 
tical assumptions of the concept to evaluate whether the Enter¬ 
prise Zone proposal is feasible. 
The most ideal method of analysis would have been to 
evaluate and study existing United States Enterprise Zones as 
to their success in meeting their ultimate economic goal. How¬ 
ever, after discussing the Enterprise Zone proposal with Mr. Bill 
Melvin, head coordinator of Enterprise Zones for the State of 
Georgia, and Sara Bell, coordinator for the State of Kentucky, 
it was concluded that there is insufficient data due to the new¬ 
ness of the Enterprise Zones. 
President Ronald Reagan and his fellow conservatives 
have long argued that growth in the private sector will help 
the poor and unemployed far more than federal aid and that the 
Reagan budget cuts would not damage the "social safety net". 
But according to the United States Bureau of the Census, in 1982 
(no report for 1983 is yet available) more Americans were below 
the poverty line than at any other time since the days of Lyndon 
Johnson's War on Poverty. The census study also indicated that 
the number of Americans existing in poverty rose from 31.8 mil¬ 
lion (14 percent) in 1981 to 34.4 million (15 percent) in 1982; 
20 
21 
this percentage is the highest since 1965. Predictably, 
poverty increased most among Blacks (35.6 percent of whom 
were poor) and Hispanics (29.9 percent); also, the largest 
single category of poor families consisted of households 
headed by women (36.3 percent of the poverty population). The 
South remains the region with the highest percentage of poor 
families (18.1 percent) and has twice as many inner city resi- 
37 dents who are below the poverty line. The Administration's 
officials stress that this poverty rate will probably decline 
by 1984, when the benefits of economic recovery begin to trickle 
down. 
As for unemployment, it remains at post-depression 
highs in many major cities despite the drop in the national 
jobless rate. The state worst off was Pennsylvania with an 
unemployment rate of 25.9 percent. Modesto, California was 
second at 23.8 percent. Conditions in other cities were 
just as depressing (see Table 2). Coupled with this is the 
tax burden. In all the major cities, the local tax burden 
has increased. In 1970 local tax per person was $383 for 
a person living in New York. By 1981 the local tax per person 
was $1,053, up by 175 percent. For a person living in Houston, 
Texas in 1970 local tax was $82 per person; by 1981 it was 
$253 per person, up by 209 percent. Residents of New York, 
Philadelphia and Baltimore now shoulder the heaviest per capita 
tax load among the major cities (see Table 3). Also fewer 
37 "U.S. Poverty by the Numbers", Newsweek, August 15, 
1983, p. 17. 
22 
TABLE 2 
STATUS OF UNEMPLOYMENT 
Highest Unemployment 
Johnstown, PA 25.9% 
Modesto, CA 23.8% 
Duluth-Superior, Minn. 22.2% 
Sharon, PA 21.9% 
Kankakee, 111. 21.4% 
Stockton, CA 20.4% 
Yountstown-Warren, Ohio 20.1% 
Muskegon-Norton Shores- 
Muskegon Heights, Mich. 19.6% 
Flint, Mich 19.5% 
Decatur, 111. 19.3% 
Peoria, 111 19.2% 
Bay City, Mich. 19.0% 
Racine, Wis. 19.0% 
Fresno, CA 18.8% 
Wheeling, WVA 18.6% 
Benton Harbor, Mich. 18.5% 
Davenport-Rock Island- 
Moline, 111. 18.2% 
Salinas-Seaside- 
Monterey, CA 18.2% 
Altoon, PA 18.1% 
Rockford, 111. 18.1% 
Jackson, Miss. 17.7% 
Canton, Ohio 17.5% 
Gary-Hammond- 
East Chicago, Ind. 17.3% 
Saginaw, Mich. 17.2% 
Battle Creek, Mich. 17.1% 
Lowest Unemployment 
Raleigh-Durham, N.C. 4.8% 
Honolulu 5.0% 
Austin, Tex. 5.1% 
Lawrence, Kan. 5.1% 
Stamford, Conn. 5.2% 
San Angelo, TX 5.5% 
Gainesville, FL 5.6% 
Abilene, TX 5.7% 
Tallahassee, FL 5.7% 
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TABLE 2 continued 


































Source: U.S. News and World Report, 
p. 8. 
April 25, 1983, 
TABLE 3 
LOCAL TAXES PER PERSON 
1970 1981 Change 
New York $383 $1 ,053 Up 175% 
Chicago $113 $ 263 Up 133% 
Los Angeles $110 $ 255 Up 132% 
Philadelphia $183 $ 500 Up 173% 
Houston $ 82 $ 253 Up 209% 
Detroit $148 $ 300 Up 103% 
Dallas $106 $ 260 Up 145% 
San Diego $ 63 $ 155 Up 146% 
Phoenix $ 72 $ 161 Up 124% 
Baltimore $222 $422 Up 99% 
Source : U.S. News, June 20, 1983, p. 40. 
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married couples are living in these blighted areas that are 
increasingly becoming homes to singles and the divorced. The 
percentage of population over age fourteen with spouse pre¬ 
sent in 1970 in Baltimore was 51.9 percent. In 1980 the per¬ 
centage was only 39.4 percent, a drop of 12.5 percent over a 
ten-year period. In Detroit in 1970, 54.9 percent of married 
couples had their spouse present and in 1980, 40.7 percent had 
their spouse present, a drop of 14.2 percent (see Table 4). 
The crime rate is also increasing at a startling rate. Serious 
crimes per 1,000 persons in San Diego in 1970 was 33; by 1982 
it was 75 crimes per 1,000 persons, up by 127 percent over a 
38 twelve-year period (see Table 5). Nevertheless, the Reagan 
Administration hopes to change all this by establishing Enter¬ 
prise Zones in those blighted areas. 
There is no shortage of reasons why these incentives 
are not likely to induce businesses to locate or expand in 
these blighted areas. According to James Traud, 
even if businesses do respond to changes in the tax 
law, studies have repeatedly demonstrated that busi¬ 
nesses do not relocate because of these changes, and 
many businesses do not even avail themselves to the 
abandonments with which cities and states try to 
tempt them.29 
Furthermore, a tax break of $6,000 or more per employee per year 
may not be a strong enough incentive to induce businesses to 
hire someone who has never had a steady job. 
38"city Life: Ways its Quality has Changed in a 
Decade", U.S. News and World Report, June 20, 1983, p. 40. 
29james Traud, "Urban Enterprise Fraud", The New 
Republic, October 18, 1982, p. 12. 
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TABLE 4 
PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION OVER AGE FOURTEEN 
MARRIED (WITH SPOUSE PRESENT) 
1970 1980 
New York 56.0% 45.7% 
Chicago 54.5% 43.3% 
Los Angeles 55.1% 46.1% 
Philadelphia , 53.5% 43.4% 
Houston 63.1% 52.2% 
Detroit 54.9% 40.7% 
Dallas 62.5% 50.7% 
San Diego 57.9% 48.7% 
Phoenix 65.1% 56.9% 
Baltimore 51.9% 39.4% 
Source: U.S. News, June 20, 1983, p. 40. 
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TABLE 5 
SERIOUS CRIMES PER 1,000 PERSONS 
IN TEN MAJOR CITIES 
1970 1982 Change 
New York 66 97 Up 47% 
Chicago 38 61 Up 61% 
Los Angeles 62 108 Up 74% 
Philadelphia 23 56 Up 143% 
Houston 49 104 Up 112% 
Detroit 84 128 Up 52% 
Dallas 60 128 Up 113% 
San Diego 33 75 Up 127% 
Phoenix 50 96 Up 92% 
Baltimore 69 93 Up 35% 
Note: Serious crimes are murder, forcible rape, 
robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, 
larceny, theft and auto theft. 
Source: U.S. News, June 20, 1983, p. 41 
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Another criticism of Enterprise Zones is that they 
would encounter competition from foreign countries like Malay¬ 
sia, Taiwan and Korea, which have already lured away many light 
industries from the United States because of their already exist¬ 
ing low-wage incentives which aid businesses in increasing their 
profits. Moreover, the possibility of United States Enterprise 
Zones having incentives great enough to prevent businesses from 
40 fleeing to these low-wage nations, is hard to conceive. 
Problems also arise with high-technology plants engaged 
in research and development activities. Because of the cultural 
and economic differences, the professional workers of the plant 
would possibly prefer to live in New York or Boston rather than 
an area such as South Bronx. If chemical research labs or elec¬ 
tronic plants were to locate in the South Bronx, for example, 
they could qualify for the tax incentives offered by the Kemp- 
Garcia bill by employing local residents as custodians, unskilled 
assemblers, lab assistants and clerical workers. But the legis¬ 
lation does not offer training for the unemployed in new skills 
or remedying their high illiteracy rate so that they can qualify 
for technical jobs. Thus, under the Reagan urban policy a num¬ 
ber of new facilities may flourish economically in depressed 
South Bronx and other similarly depressed areas, but few local 
41 residents will gain more than a low-paying entry-level job. 
Other zone critics point to the fact that the major tax 
40 Stanely Aronowitz and Cary Goodman, "A Walk on the 
Supply Side", The Nation, February 21, 1981, p. 208. 
41 
Ibid., p. 208. 
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cuts provide no "start-up" money for small businesses. A study 
conducted by David Birch of the Massachusetts Institute of Tech¬ 
nology shows that 80 percent of new jobs that have become avail¬ 
able were created by businesses with less than 100 employees, 
and in the past ten years, nearly 20 percent of new private 
sector employment has come from businesses with twenty or fewer 
42 employees. He further asserts that these businesses are too 
small and too numerous, and fail to meaningfully benefit from 
traditionally "targeted aid". Moreover, tax credits are useless 
unless one can make a profit, and most small or new businesses 
make little or no profit in their initial years. They need 
money immediately to expand their businesses or at least to 
43 maintain business at existing levels. Therefore, the principal 
beneficiaries would be existing profitable firms, not small and 
minority businesses since they cannot take full advantage of the 
opportunity to reduce or eliminate tax liability by deducting 
44 half of their gross receipts from taxable income. 
The writer wishes to furter reinforce this point by 
examining the more "established" Enterprise Zones in Florida 
and Connecticut. A study done by Coopers and Lybrand for the 
United States Small Business Administration (SBA) of Enter¬ 
prise Zones established in Connecticut and Florida concluded 
4 2 Roby Boschwitz, "Are Proposed Kemp-Garcia Urban Enter¬ 
prise Zones a Sound Approach to U.S. Urban Revitalization?" 
Congressional Digest, March 1982, p. 78. 
43Traud, "Urban Enterprise Fraud", p. 12. 
^4Boschwitz, "Are Proposed Kemp-Garcia Urban Enterprise 
Zones a Sound Approach to U.S. Urban Revitalization?" p. 79. 
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that Enterprise Zones incentives generate significant bene¬ 
fits to established businesses, but small businesses may be 
unable to take full advantage of these benefits during the 
initial years of operation, when the probability of business 
failure is quite high. Further, they point out that the in¬ 
centives have only a marginal effect on a business's cash flow 
during its first years of operation. Thus, in determining the 
incentives' real value, the small business must discount its 
potential return because the tax credits are not available when 
they are needed most. When they are available in the latter 
years, they contribute to existing positive cash flows. Also, 
the available tax credits would be of greater value in initial 
years to established businesses considering expansion than to 
4 5 start-up businesses without an established record of earnings. 
(See Tables 6 and 7.) 
The unfair competitive advantage Enterprise businesses 
will have over other businesses located just outside the desig¬ 
nated Enterprise Zone areas will cause a setback for the non¬ 
zone businesses. Thus the economic vitality of the non-zone 
businesses would suffer because the benefits to be derived are 
46 skewed toward businesses in Enterprise Zones. Also, this 
would pose a threat to existing businesses in the zone areas 
that are already providing employment, but are unable to meet 
47 Jane Houlton and Fiona Mallon, "Erroneous Zones", 
New Statesman, August 20, 1982, p. 6. 
48 Barbara Rosen, "U.K. Enterprise Zones Seem Successful 
but Depend Largely on Government Aid", Wall Street Journal, 
April 29, 1983, p. 36. 
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TABLE 6 
CRITERIA AND INCENTIVES FOR FLORIDA ENTERPRISE ZONES 
Criteria for Designation: 
The following are considered 
- Housing conditions 
- Per capita income 
- Percent of elderly and youth residents 
- Unemployment 
- Per capita local taxes 
Zone Incentives: 
- A credit against the corporation income tax is pro¬ 
vided equal to 25 percent of the wages of new em¬ 
ployees for a period up to 12 months. Effective 
dates 7/1/80 - 6/30/86. 
- A credit against the corporation income tax is pro¬ 
vided for new or expanded businesses equal to 96 per¬ 
cent of the school portion of ad valorem taxes levied 
Credit can be claimed for 10 years up to a maximum of 
$40,000 annually. Unused portions may be carried for 
ward up to five years. Effective dates 1/1/81 - 
12/31/86. 
- Allows firms a 50 percent credit on Florida income 
tax for donations to local community development pro¬ 
jects. Must be made through an eligible agency such 
as a community development corporation or community 
action program. Annual amount of credit limited to 
$200,000 per firm and $3,000,000 for the State. 
- Provides loans to Community Development Corporations. 
All loans shall be interest free and shall be repaid 
within 5 years. 
Source: The Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, Atlanta, Georgia, February 1984. 
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TABLE 7 
CRITERIA AND INCENTIVES FOR CONNECTICUT 
ENTERPRISE ZONES 
Criteria for Designation: 
Must have one of the Following: 
- 25 percent or more of the population below poverty 
level 
- 25 percent or more of the population dependent on 
welfare 
- An unemployment rate twice that of the State average 
Zone Incentives: 
- $1,500,000 available in venture capital loans to 
small businesses. 
- 50 percent State corporate income tax credit. 
- Assessments phased over a 7-year period for new 
construction. 
- $1,000 provided to manufacturers for each new job 
created. 
- Purchases of spare or replacement parts are exempt 
from sales tax. 
- Employment training vouchers. 
- Property tax abatements for new manufacturing projects. 
Source: The Department of Housing and Urban Develop¬ 
ment, Atlanta, Georgia, February 1984. 
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the Act's criteria for tax credit and other Enterprise Zone 
benefits. 
The British, who were the first to implement Enterprise 
Zones have similar incentives for rebuilding their depressed 
areas. The eleven zones that have been established for job 
creation in Britain have proven to be unsuccessful. At best 
they have generated windfall profits for businesses and devel- 
opers who just happened to be in the right place at the right 
time. During the process, they have caused a lot of disruption 
and discontent. The zones indeed attracted a large number of 
businesses into their areas, but the majority were established 
47 businesses that were uprooting from bases elsewhere. And if 
this is not discouraging enough, Victor Hausner, a senior Visit 
ing Fellow at the Policy Studies, Institute, states: 
that the British incentives are tied to property, not 
to people as the U.S. proposals suggest, and that is 
an important distinction, also in the U.S. they're 
trying to crack a much tougher nut.4^ 
The current status of Enterprise Zone legislation is 
summarized on Table 11 and Table 12. A more detailed status 
report released by the National Association of State Develop¬ 
ment Agencies is shown on Tables 13, 14 and 15. An overview in 
terms of state Enterprise Zone legislation enacted and state 
administrative Enterprise Zone programs is shown on the map 
provided (see Appendix B). 
^Jane Houlton and Fiona Mallon, "Erroneous Zones", 
New Statesman, August 20, 1982, p. 6. 
A o 
*°Barbara Rosen, "U.K. Enterprise Zones Seem Successful 
but Depend Largely on Government Aid", Wall Street Journal, 
April 29, 1983, p. 36. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Will Enterprise Zones revitalize the depressed areas 
of the nation's cities? Only time will tell. Tax incentives 
would be a very effective tool in creating jobs and stimulat¬ 
ing realities that many business enterprises do not wish to 
face. As earlier referred to, these include a high crime rate, 
an unskilled labor force, and the higher costs of doing busi¬ 
ness in cities with declining tax bases. It is possible how¬ 
ever that Enterprise Zones could serve as one of many approaches 
to urban economic development. 
Other urban economic development proposals, such as, 
Model Cities, CETA and Operation Bootstrap, have failed in their 
attempt to revitalize the urban area. Although Enterprise Zones 
offer a fresh approach, tax incentives alone cannot solve the 
underlying social problems of the nation's cities. These prob¬ 
lems and realities of the cities must be addressed before any 
supply-side theory can be put into effect. 
This writer recommends that a number of things must 
first be done if Enterprise Zones are to be adopted as a viable 
approach to urban economic development: 
1. Require businesses who participate in Enterprise Zones 
to set up training and education programs to train 
prospective employees. 
2. Businesses should be required to hire and train a cer¬ 
tain percentage of residents in the zone to middle 
and upper management positions. 
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3. Effectively target the tax breaks. Smaller firms 
with less operating capital and profits should be 
given greater tax breaks in the initial years of 
operation. 
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